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As emphasized above, however, there are apparently no 
tendentious political statements in the actual mathematical 
content of the book. 
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This is an interesting book that employs a nice interplay 
of the theoretical and empirical aspects of science while con- 
sidering the important role played by metaphysics, or “world view,” 
in the establishment of scientific theories. In examining the 
research program--or perhaps several research programs--conduc- 
ted by Christian Huygens in the seventeenth century, Elzinga 
pursues his general purpose of tracing the relationships between 
theories and the solution of empirical problems and describing 
the support and direction given the theories by a world view 
that had a particularly strong influence on that important contri- 
butor to the establishment of modern science. 
This examination of the work of one seventeenth century 
scientist is carried out in a treatise that stands itself as an 
illustration of the point El zinga makes through the use of 
Huygens’ work. Just as he describes Cartesian metaphysics as a 
perspective that provides a foundation for Huygens’ theories--the 
theories then being used to define the empirical problems he sets 
out to solve--so do we also find Elzinga, with a discernible but 
essentially unarticulated world view, presenting a theory in the 
philosophy of science that is used to describe a set of empirical 
events and “explain” them in a context that leads to better un- 
derstanding of that set of events. As Elzinga says (page 5)) 
7, . . . the metascientific inquiry I am making is an instance where 
the theoretical pole dominates over the empirical. Thi s case study 
is itself an example of a piece of theoretical work.” 
The history of science is, for Elzinga, the empirical data 
used in the development of a theory or philosophy of science; the 
theory and the data play back and forth on one another in such a 
way that the shape of the theory is rounded and trimmed in ac- 
cordance with the historical data, and the data are “seen in their 
respective places” with their various interrelationships as identi- 
fiable parts of the shape or form of the theory. The world 
view, it might be said in this metaphor, could only have to do 
with the human preference for one form rather than another, al- 
though one comes to suspect that Elzinga believes there is a sense 
in which one world view can be demonstrated as being “truly better 
than” another. 
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Elzinga describes his book as being divided into two main 
parts. The first part is I'... the logico-historical development 
of aspects of the theory of research itself." The second is an 
examination of the way a given theory of research founded upon a 
Cartesian world outlook nay be observed as leading to the emergence 
of a unique set of physical concepts. 
The first part, which he describes as being articulated most 
specifically in Chapters Two, Three, and Seven, gives the neta- 
theoretical ground for the discussion of a theory of research. 
Here he is concerned with the metamorphic growth of science from 
Aristotle's reaction to ancient mechanism, through the "Terninist 
period" described as a transition that took place in a struggle 
between the organismic and mechanistic concepts, and finally the 
seventeenth century Galilean mechanism ultimately supported by the 
Cartesian metaphysics. 
In his discussion of the work of Huygens specifically, Elzinga 
finds Huygens located somewhere between Cartesian rationalism and 
Baconian Empiricism, with more a lean toward Cartesiansin insofar 
as his research 'I... is viewed as a complex of cognitive processes 
with theoretical and experimental sides" (page 7). 
His Cartesian metaphysics, writes Elzinga, was both an ins- 
piration and a limitation for Huygens. For example, Descartes' 
conception of a mathematical model for the physical world and a 
mechanistic description of physical activity was taken up by 
Huygens as the structure in which he could conduct his research 
with a maximum of rigor and a clear comprehension of what he was 
doing: what the problems were, what were the theorems that needed 
to be proved, what he could expect in the way of empirical results 
and what could safely be ignored as "unimportant data" in the world 
of his laboratory. At the sane tine, however, the Cartesian 
netaphysic "fettered Huygens' imagination" (page 80, et seq.). 
In matters such as the gravitational relationship between the earth 
and the noon and the phenomena of electricity and magnetism, he 
could think only of direct mechanical action in the medium of a 
vortex and was 'I... still unable to cast his Cartesian conceptual 
crutch." He was never willing fully to accept the work of Isaac 
Newton particularly in light of Newton's dependence upon action 
at a distance as fundamental. 
Elzinga presents a concise and valid criticism of the enpiri- 
cisn founded on the writings of Francis Bacon and the rationalism 
that was epitomized in the work of RenG Descartes. In particular, 
he shows how the important advances did not cone by following 
Bacon or Descartes in their "quest for certainty" (the imagined 
certainty that could be produced by the "actual facts as enpirical- 
ly observed" or, on the other hand, by "careful and systematic 
reasoning from clear and distinct fundamental principles"). In 
Huygens he finds a "dialectical combination of what is correct 
in both" (page 16). 
A major flaw in Elzinga's book appears as what I take to be 
a limitation influenced by his own world view or perspective. 
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He rightly describes the scientific process in terms that bring 
ideological and metaphysical matters into the picture as essential 
elements in the work of the creative scientist. He shows how the 
great innovator in science must be someone with the imagination and 
flexibility to formulate theories in accordance with his world 
picture and then extend and modify that picture as the theories and 
their associated experiments require. In short, he describes ex- 
tremely well the interplay between the activities of the scientist, 
the deductive and experimental work that the scientist does, the 
theories and hypotheses he formulates and the world view that 
gives him his perspective and provides him the heuristic influ- 
ence that enables him to proceed into new areas of discovery. 
The limitations confronted by Elzinga are due to a picture 
he seems to have of the world: that there is one world or a 
world that stands as some kind of ultimate reference according to 
which theories, hypotheses and even world views may be validated. 
He speaks throughout the book of “natural reality” (25), an ‘lob- 
jective reality” (67), a “physical reality” (110)) a “region of 
reality” (125), and he frequently uses the phrase “epistemic 
mapping” by which he means the creation by a philosopher or 
scientist of an epistemology that “maps” or, perhaps, finds a par- 
ticular way through the “territory” (his term) that is the objec- 
tive world. 
There is, then, the assumption or adoption of a world view 
by Elzinga that provides him with an ultimate criterionofthe 
truly true or really real according to which any of the various 
theories of science and the world views on which they are founded 
may be given some ultimate justification. Or, if they are never 
ultimately justified--as he indeed does seem to intend in a kind of 
fallibilistic approach similar to the one of Karl Popper--they are 
made physchologically more tenable by the fact that the positive 
results they achieve may then be supposed to demonstrate that they 
have more closely mirrored objective reality. 
This objective, or natural, world view adopted by Elzinga 
becomes the limiting factor that prevents him from taking the final 
step into a philosophy that makes man alone responsible for the 
systems he invents and by which he lives. 
His criticism of Thomas Kuhn is an illustration of his un- 
willingness to accept the thesis that the systems of men are 
their systems for which they are fundamentally responsible--sys- 
tems that they have devised according to the things that interest 
them and that work, in large part, as a result of their being 
totally committed to them. 
He speaks of Kuhn’s “subjective idealism” (page 137) which 
is only another indication of Elzinga’s world view--an outgrowth of 
traditional European philosophy--acting to limit him in his under- 
standing of a more pregnant, richly heuristic world view in the 
philosophy of science. The very use of such a term as “subjec- 
tive idealism” in describing the work of Kuhn is clearly anachronistic 
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The difference between idealism--either subjective or objective-- 
and the pragmatic, instrumentalist approach of Kuhn is the.dif- 
ference between a realism fraught with religious influences-- 
"real" ideas in or of an omniscient mind--, and an operational, 
though not positivistic, description of a world that takes shape 
out of the interests of innovative human minds. 
Revolutions in science, writes Elzinga, are "part of a wider 
sum of forces... .than what is suggested in Kuhn's model of the 
paradigm" (page 123). I submit that Kuhn's philosophy takes the 
"wider sum of forces" into account in a much more effective way 
than does any realism, whether it be neo- or orthodox, because 
of the limitations that go along with such a realism in terms of 
final goals or ultimate truths. Even if such "goals" and "truths" 
are never to be finally achieved and never to be known for certain, 
they are as much restrictive limitations as they are heuristic 
assumptions. 
Kuhn, writes Elzinga (page 137), becomes involved in irra- 
tionalism with his tendency to look for majority consensus (though 
he himself speaks of central principles being "established and ac- 
cepted by a majority of investigators in the field..." (page 119)). 
However, it is not irrationalism that characterized Kuhn's position 
on this matter, but non-rationalism--which is a point to which 
Elzinga should give some careful consideration. 
Elzinga speaks critically of "instrumentalism" as, apparently, 
a shallow and somewhat devious way of getting around with a theory 
that does not square with "reality" (see particularly his comments 
about the Church and Galileo's defense of Copernicanism, pages 
64-5; also, some comments on page 80 and in note 16, page 138). 
A fuller understanding of the term "instrumentalist" as it is 
used, for example, by John Dewey, would lead him, I believe, to 
modify or even drop the use of that term in the manner he does. 
In fact, when I read his criticism of the Baconian empiricists and 
the Cartesian rationalists concerning their "quest for certainty," 
it seems that Elzinga could make some very telling points, and 
profit himself, by referring to the book by John Dewey that carried 
that phrase as its title: The Quest For Certainty. 
In conclusion, I wish to affirm again my admiration for 
Elzinga's book and recommend ittoanyonewhomaybe interested in 
examining the integral relationships between science, metaphysics 
and man--man, the creative thinker and inventor who has devised 
ingenious and wondrous ways of pursuing the activities of his 
life. For my own part, however, I find the work coming just 
short of the mark as a description of the human condition, which 
is the condition wherein man's final responsibility for the things 
he does rests squarely and ultimately on the commitments he makes 
to world views that have no ultimate source of validation-- 
known, unknown or even possible. 
